Under the ageing King Abdullah, those in the al-Saud family seeking to advance economic, legal, and political (or, perhaps more accurately, administrative) reform seem to be in a race against the clock. The assumption of many inside the Kingdom is that the next two to three years could be decisive. Elite figures sympathetic to reform are concerned that what has been achieved—modest by international standards, significant by Saudi Arabia’s—will stall under a King Sultan or a King Naif (the more likely of the two, given health concerns about Crown Prince Sultan). Changes made since Abdullah acceded in 2005 lack an institutional basis and have not captured the imagination of the Saudi public, leading to the impression that they constitute personal whims that can just as easily be taken back or put indefinitely on the back burner.
Reform in Saudi Arabia does not constitute a clearly articulated program intended to reach a defined outcome; rather, what is often referred to as reform is more about changing the environment. A more open environment has certainly emerged in the last few years. Various media outlets controlled by Saudi Arabia’s competitive ruling elite publish different commentaries on the local and regional political scene. But this is not a true debate; it is more a public posting of distinct opinions. Among the issues receiving the most attention are the appropriate role of women and the related role of the mutawa’in (religious police), public sector corruption, education reform, and the need for Saudi nationals to be better equipped for a more dynamic private sector.