sociology is a science like any other, and leads him to do precisely what he condemns Foucault and Althusser for (i.e., treating social science as a lower form of knowledge with a doubtful claim on the title of science). (104) It is only one of many contradictions and inconsistencies in this book.
Bourdieu's argument about the censoring power of the field is not particularly new. Kuhn's conceptualization of a paradigm as a "disciplinary matrix" (1962/1970) captures the idea precisely. Indeed, the way Bourdieu promotes the importance of his own work makes this book read like a priority of discovery argument. He claims to have discovered, and discovered more properly, what others have claimed for themselves. Indeed, he implies that he discovered the social character of science before SSK: "I wrote my first text on the scientific field, in the early 1970s, that is to say, at a time when the 'new sociology of science' had not yet emerged." (96) His article was published in 1975, but key works by Barry Barnes and Harry Collins were published before that, and Michael Muikay's foundational critique of Mertonian functionalism was published in 1969. The journal of SSK, Science Studies (Social Studies of Science) was first published in 1971, and David Bloor published his book on "the strong programme" in 1976.
Unfortunately, this is only one of many inaccuracies and misrepresentations. Bourdieu egregiously conflates SSK with post structuralism, thus implicating SSK in what he calls a "cynical" and "nihilist" view of science. Nothing could be further from the truth. SSK was the first attempt at a "science of science," and with a staunchly empirical research agenda, it revealed how all belief, including scientific belief, is socially constructed in particular historical and cultural contexts. Yet SSK said nothing about the truth or falsity of such beliefs. As far as SSK is concerned, it is for those credentialed in a field of knowledge to decide, with respect to their own fields, what is true and what is false, what is good method or not. Indeed, SSKers think it rather immodest for philosophers or sociologists to believe that they could instruct other scientists in how to do their science better. Rather, through sociological research, SSK revealed that science was a tremendous cultural achievement, and an achievement to be lauded. Thus it is a gross misrepresentation to suggest that SSK was nihilist about scientific knowledge, or that it sought "destroy" science. SSKers love science, and that is one of the reasons they are led to study it. But they love it as it is. not as one might wish it to be.
Unlike Bourdieu, SSK does not begin with a commitment to the idea of universal truth and therl teleologically explain its genesis. Yet this does not mean that SSKers are epistemological and/or ontological relativists. Rather they are methodological relativists. Nor are SSKers the philosophical sociologists for which Bourdieu expresses such distain. SSK simply would not have been possible without a confrontation with analytic philosophy. Bourdieu expresses a similar distain for what he calls the philosopher historians (e.g. Foucault). He explains that he "Firmly" held to the title "sociologist," eschewing the "double game" and "double profit" of intercisciplinarity that he found "profoundly antipathetic," "not least because ... (it) ... seemed to me to announce a lack of ethical and scientific rigour." (106) It is for this reason, he claims, that he "could not enter the debates on science as they were conducted in the 1970s." (106)
Bourdieu's negative perception of SSK in the early 1970s, no matter how wrong-headed, can perhaps be forgiven. But for him to continue to hold to it in 2001, and then to exhibit such vitriol about a field he failed to understand or contribute to, and in addition to claim that he in fact discovered all that SSK lays claim to before that field was even formed, is an undeniable failure of ethical and scientific rigor. For this reviewer, who was enlivened by Bourdieu's work as a student, and who has never subsequently been hostile to it. this book is a profound disappointment.
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Argumen Bourdieu tentang kemampuan menyensor di lapangan bukan hal yang baru. konseptualisasi Kuhn tentang paradigma sebagai "matriks disipliner" (1962/1970) menangkap gagasan secara tepat. Memang, cara Bourdieu mempromosikan pentingnya karyanya sendiri membuat buku ini dibaca seperti prioritas penemuan argumen. Dia mengaku telah menemukan, dan menemukan lebih layak, apa yang orang lain telah mengklaim bagi diri mereka sendiri. Memang, ia menyiratkan bahwa dia menemukan karakter sosial dari pengetahuan sebelum SSK: "Saya menulis karya pertama saya di bidang ilmiah, pada awal tahun 1970, yang mengatakan, pada saat itu keilmuan sosiologi baru belum lagi muncul. " (96) Artikelnya diterbitkan pada tahun 1975, tetapi ide pembukanya oleh Barry Barnes dan Harry Collins diterbitkan sebelum itu, dan kritik mendasar Michael Muikay tentang fungsionalisme Mertonian diterbitkan pada tahun 1969. Jurnal dari SSK, Ilmu Studi (Ilmu Sosial) pertama kali diterbitkan pada tahun 1971, dan David Bloor menerbitkan bukunya tentang "program yang kuat" pada tahun 1976.
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